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This morning I shbuld like to talk with you briefly about our
national defense.
The first thing we should bear in mind ih discussing this vital
subject / is that, due to changed conditions, we can no longer treat
national defense as an isolated category, separate and distinct from
other aspects and functions of oi+r national life.
Today it is indeed true that "the front is everywhere."

Our

national defense capabilities are no longer determined, as in the past,
almost exclusively by our strength in matters purely military -- that
is by the power of our army, our navy, our air force, our weapons -
put by the state of our total national strength ..
For that reason, before I cyiscuss the purely military aspects
of our defense picture, I wish to emphasize that we must at all times
remember / that weapons and armed might alone are not enough,
Soviet Union is waging total cold war against us.

The

It is the thinking

of many of those who have studied the world situation most closely/
that the Soviet threat on the economic and diplomatic front is far
more serious, far more deadly, than their military threat.
I think it goes without saying that the Soviet Union, or any
nation, would prefer to avoid the horrors of a nuclear war, a war
which involves at least

.§.2~

risk of being unsuccessful / and which in

any event will result in enormous destruction$

So long as they can

achieve their objectives by means of economic penetration, diplomatic
victories, subversion -- possibly supplemented by "little wars,"
limited warfare such as that which was employed with success in Indo-
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China---, they have no need to risk an all-out military conflict with
the free world.

In fact, there is probably much more danger of a

major warvs arising almost by accident, against the real wishes of
either side, as a result of the tremendous accumulation of inter
national tension that has been built up, than as a result of any
deliberately planned surprise attack.
Many-people seem to be unaware of the great danger to our
national securityj'which is posed by this economic and diplomatic
offensive of the Russians.

We have been too accustomed to thinking of

defense in purely military terms.
Nothing would be more ruinous / than a policy by which we would
devote so much of our energy and our resources to building weapons for
militar

defense / that we would neglect these other fields and permit

the rapid spread of Soviet control through "peaceful" methods, that is,
through the methods of the cold war.
We would soon find ourselves in an isolated position, cut off
from the rest of the world, and unable to service and maintain the
elaborate and intricate military machine which we had been so busily
engaged in building up.

In a comparatively short time, we would

become so inferior militarily vis-a-vis the Communist world that
serious resistance would be out of the question.

In other words,

having lost on the diplomatic and economic fronts, we would find that
our military position was hopeless also.
We cannot withdraw behind a wall, or behind two oceans.
cannot run away from the conflict.

We

We cannot at this time afford to

pull out of Europe and Asia and Africa.

By abandoning those parts of

the free world to Communist totalitarianism, we would be doing grave
danger to our own position.

Even if -- I should say, especiallv if -

we look at the picture from the cold standpoint of pure self-interest,
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we cannot retreat to this hemisphere.
That is why, in addition to maintaining our bases abroad, it is
important for stable non-Communist (and preferably anti-Communist)
governments to be maintained abroad.

Every time another country is

brought within the Soviet sphere, either by political subversion or by
economic penetration, the balance of world economic and political
power tips more dangerously

against us.

The more the balance is

tipped against us, the more painful and difficult it is to resist
the pressure.
impossible.

Finally, a point is reached beyond which resistance is
The loss of certain economically strategic areas in the

Middle East and South Asia to Communist control / might well represent
that fatal point, beyond which the steady rise of Communist power
would be irresistible.
To maintain these stable non-Communist governments, so vital to
our own national security, requires a sound, alert and aggressive
diplomatic effort.

It is tragic to think of what we have already lost,

since 1945, through diplomatic failure -- especially in the case of
China.
The maintenance of strong non-Communist governments abroad is
also going to require, in conjunction with our diplomatic effort, a
certain amount of military and technical assistance.

Such aid should,

however, be restricted to those nations which are firmly allied with
us / or at least which lean toward us rather than against us.

I cannot

see any sense in supplying arms, money, and technical know-how to
countries which are as apt as not to use these assets against us.
Where those nations which are friendly are in need of economic
assistance, as well as military and technical, I feel that this
economic aid should be in the form of loans and not outright gifts.
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Though we have tried to do so for years, we cannot buy friendship
with gifts.

~

A great part of our foreign aid program up to now has been
money down a rathole.
tration of the program.

To some extent, this has been due to maladminis
There is no room for waste, fbr mismanagement,

for a poor sense of selectivity in an area such as this.

I believe

that by revamping completely our aid program we can achieve far
better results and yet cut the cost very very substantially.
It is essential that we practice economy in this field as well
as in others.

If we do not, we are endangering our national security

at another vital point.

As I said at the outset, the state of national

defense in these times depends upon the total national strength picture ~
and a very vital part of that picture is the national economy.

If

our internal economy suffers a serious breakdown, we could be defeated
without the firing of a shot.
can stand.

There is a limit to what our economy

The Russians know that, and have expressed the belief

that they can destroy this country by forcing it to spend itself
to death.
We have tremendous tasks facing us on all sides.
involved is staggering.

The expense

Obviously, at this time, we must supply

without stint whatever funds are genuinely needed by the military for
scientific research and weapons development.

It should go without

saying, then, that wherever waste and mismanagement can be found, they

.

must be ruthlessly eliminated, in order that we get every ounce of
value for every penny we expend.

I believe that it can fairly be

said that the field of foreign aid is a field in which we can effect
substantial saving and at the same time achieve greatly improved
results.
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The greater cutbacks, however, should come in our domestic
spending.

We are going to have to cut the fat out of the Federal

governmentVs already-swollen domestic programs.
to halt the expansion of these programs.
are going

'to

We are going to have

We as individual citizens

have to adjust to some belt-tightening too.

Up to this point, I have emphasized the foreign-relations
aspect of our national security, and also the national economy aspect,
because I fear that there has been a tendency on the part of many of
us to lose sight of the importance of these aspects.

The reason for

this is, of course, that public attention during the past few months
has been so pre-occupied with the problem of defense from the military
preparedness standpoint.
This is, of course, the most immedietely urgent aspect of the
defense problem.

Unless and until Russia and the United States are

able to harmonize their relations and attitudes, which is scarcely
foreseeable today, it is vitally necessary that we maintain a sound
military defense posture.
And by this I mean not only in the missiles field but in the
entire field of military preparedness, including the maintenance of
strong ground forces.
We know the Russians have 175 divisions in their ground forces.
They have the tanks and other heavy equipment for JOO divisions.

The

Russians are not relying wholly on push-buttons and long-range
missiles; they are keeping their ground forces at a high level of
efficiency.
I am strongly opposed to any cutbacks whatsoever in any phase
of our military defense at the present.

But if it is found to be

absolutely necessary to reduce the division strength of our Army, then
we should place increased emphasis on our Reserve and National Guard
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programs.

We can maintain six National Guard or Reserve divisions

fo~ the same cost of one regular division.

This is no time to talk

of cutbacks in our National Guard and Reserve strength.

If we

sharply reduce our Regular Forces, and then hack away at our Reserves
and National Guard too, we will be left with practically nothing in
/

the way of ground forces.
So long as we are strong, there is little chance of attack by
Russia.

As I said earlier, the Soviet leaders do not want to star~

a war which will involve any substantial risk of defeat or even of
heavy destruction at home, especially when they can achieve their
aims without it.

But a war which the Soviet leaders would regard

as a pushover would be viewed in a different light.

We are in grave

danger, and world peace is in grave danger, whenever we let our guard
down, whenever our strength drops appreciably below theirs.
It is now tragically clear that the Russians are considerably
a~1ead of us in rocket and missile development.

Despite our recent

success in launching a satellite, the fact remains that we a~e far
behind the Soviets in this field of development.
we are is hard to tell.

Just how far behind

Dr. Wernher von Braun, our foremost missiles

expert, who is in charge of the Army 9 s program, says that it may take
us as much as five years to catch up with the Russians.

I feel,

though, that if the proper effort is exerted, we can catch up in a much
snorter period of time.
I do not think that I need to discuss in detail the status of
development of the various types and classes of missiles.

The public

is quite familiar with them, so much so that the names of these fear
some weapons have practically become household words.

I will only

point out that we are still quite a long way from having an operational
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Intercontinental Ballistic Missile.

Neither the Atlas nor the Titan,

both being developed by the Air Force, has yet been perfected and may
not be so for some time.
There is a device called the Snark which might be operational
before that time, but the Snark is really a subsonic, air-breathing
pilotless aircraft, vulnerable to interc~ption, and is therefore not
really a true ICBM.
Nor do we have an operational Intermediate Range Ballistic
Missile.

The Army's Jupiter (not to be confused with the Jupiter-C

vehicle which was used to launch our satellite) is not operational
at this time; nor is the Air Force's Thor; though both should be by
the end of this year, according to Secretary McElroy.

The Navy has

recently announced great strides in the development of its IRBM, the
Polaris, but it will still probably not be operational for some tim~c
In addition to the field of rocket and missile development,
wl th which we are all fairly familiar, there are two specific areas
in whicn our defense program is seriously lagging, and these I wish
to discuss with you briefly at this time.
The first is the matter of submarine development.

Submarines

~re going to play a tremendously important part in any future war 1
not only in their traditional role as destroyers of surface shipping,
but as mobile and elusive rocket launching platforms.
we are peculiarly vulnerable to submarine attack.

Unfortunately

So many of our

large cities and major industrial centers, and our capital, are
situated either directly on, or near to, our long and easily access
ible coastlines.

Even with missiles of comparatively short range,

think of the destruction which could be wrought by a fleet of Soviet
submarines, strung along our Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific coasts,
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launching a coordinated and simultaneous rocket attack against this
country.
Due to the facts of geography, the Soviet Union is less
vulnerable to this type of attack than we are.

To come within even

fairly close range of the Soviet social and industrial heartland,
our submarines would have to penetrate the narrow waterways of the
Baltic and Black Seas.

Those portions of Russia's coast which do

border directly on open sea, such as the Arctic and Kamchatkan coasts ,
are a long distance from any major concentrations of industrial
targetso

Nevertheless, industrial targets in some of the satellite

countries, as well as the Soviets' outer military bases and air
stations -- and especially their own submarine bases

, would not

be immune to this type of attack; and we should push our nuclear
submarine program as fast as possible.
This we are not doing.

I regret to say that, while the Soviet

navy has more than 500 submarines, ours has only 110.

While the

Russians are building a large number of submarines yearly, we are
building only several annually.

Thus the gap continues to widen.

Another vital factor in our national security program is our
Strategic Air Force.

For over ten years, the bombers of the Strategic

Air Command have been the free world's greatest deterrent to aggres
sion; they are so today and, pending successful development of our
missiles, they will be for some time to come.

That this is true has

been generally recognized by most responsible officials, including
President Eisenhower.
Yet, despite this, just six months prior to the launching of
the first Sputnik, heavy reductions were made in the Strategic Air
Command.

Three months after Sputnik there had been no restoration of

these reductions.
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The S~rategic Air Command suffers from a shortage of B-52 bombers
and has been relying heavily on B-36 9 s, which have been termed
obsolete.

The bomber bases are congested.

Some units were actually

grounded last year because of lack of funds for gasoline.

Lack of

funds has also hampered the Strategic Air Command 9 s training and
maintenance programs.
It is admitted on all sides that, until such time as we have
perfected our missiles to the extent where they can be completely
relied upon, the Strategic Air Command is vital to our national
security.

It is imperative, then, that it be kept in the strongest

and most efficient condition at all times, ready for action at a
moment 9 s notice.

That this condition has not been maintained is no~

the fault of any lag in scientific development.

Nor is it due to any

failure on the part of Congress to appropriate sufficient money, for
we provided every cent that was asked for these purposes.

It is

simply a case of almost inexcusable administrative failure, or,
rather, of inherent weakness in the organizational structure of our
defense establishment.
Whatever part our failures in education and scientific studies
have in our defense crisis, in a remote or indirect sense, the fact
remains that the more immediate cause of our troubles can be found
in the structure of our Defense Department.

Harmful inter-service

rivalry, duplication of effort, useless and time-consuming administra
tive procedures, waste, and poor coordination have been prevalent,
and have prevented progress which should have been made.
The truth is that, back in 1947 when the structure of the
military establishment was overhauled and the Department of Defense
was created, true unification of the Armed Services was not achieved
- 9 -

in any real sense.

The Editor of one of our leading aviation maga

zines has recently summed up the result of this so-called attempt
at unification, the National Security Act of 1947 and the Defense
Department which it established, as follows~
"The result was a hydraheaded compromise of military,
industrial and political influences•••
"The result was an economic monster whose hunger
devours the national income without assuring the
national defense.
"This intellectual travesty is represented to the
American people as balanced power. In some respects,
it is indeed balanced. It is balanced politically;
balanced to usurp military leadership by secretarial
bureaucracy; balanced to consume the tax payer;
balanced to generate unrelenting interservice bitter
ness; balanced to compromise every known tenet of
military command; balanced to swallow the talents of
great officers in all services; ••• balanced to waste
manpower: balanced to assure the Soviet lead time in
technology to the point that American conquest probably
eventually will be accomplished without a shot in self
defense.
"But insofar as being balanced for the prevention of war;
or balanced to secure the most defense for the least
cost; ••• or balanced to lead the United States into the
cosmic phase of the air environment, no contrivance was
ever more ill fitted to its mission.., 11
It may be that this indictment is too severe.

But it becomes

increasingly obvious month by month that the Defense Department needs,
not any mere superficial streamlining, but a complete overhaul of its
basic structure.

True unification of the services must be achieved,

in spirit and in fact.

We cannot let interservice competition

degenerate into interservice rivalry, jealousy and bitterness that
impede our defense effort.
With this in mind, I plan to introduce a bill which calls for
a comprehensive reorganization of the Department of Defense~

This

bill will strike at the root of many of our defense troubles; it will
clearly establish responsibility for assignment of tasks; it will
reduce decision time; it will retain civilian control of the defense
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establishment; and it will promote economy.

Under this reorganization

proposal, the civilian control now exercised jointly by civilians in
the three departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force with the civilians
in the Department of Defense would be centralized in the hands of the
civilians of the Department of Defense.

The separate services would

become divisions of the Department of Defense rather than separate
departments within a department as they are now.

On a level with

these three divisions would be created a fourth service for research
and development.
My bill also proposes to create a single Chief of Staff of
the Armed Services, to be appointed by the President from the
military personnel of the Armed Forces.

The Chief of Staff would be

vested with the functions now held by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the additional function of command of combined forces.

The senior

officers of the four divisions of the Armed Forces would, as a groups
act as advisors to the Chief of Staff in all of his functions.
In the interest of economy, I further propose in this
legislation, that all items of supply co ri1mon to two or more of the
four divisions of the Department of Defense, be procured by a single
agency at Defense Department level.
Another plan of unification is being prepared under the
direction of the Secretary of Defense, who has said that he hopes
to have it ready to submit to Congress around March

JO.

It is not my intention that Congress should enact any legisla
tion along this line before hearing the recommendations of the
Defense Department.

At the same time, I do not feel that Congress,

which bears the primary responsibility for all legislation, should
sit back and wait for the Executive Branch to draft the law.
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The sooner we can begin the process of holding hearings and s,i'ting
ideas, the better we will be prepared to consider the Executiv1 9 s
ideas when they arrive.
I believe that a thorough revamping of our Defense Department 9 s
organizational structure, such as I have just outlined, is a necessary
first step toward the establishment and maintenance of a sound
security program.
But there is more than this.

This is only a first step.

We must overcome grave problems in the field of education.

We must match the Russians in weapons research and development.
We must preserve the strength of our free government at home,
the free government that has made it possible for us to become the
strongest and happiest nation in the world.
I have faith in America, and in the American people.

I know

what our people can do when the chips are down.
And let us make no mistake about it, the chips are down.
Let us pledge ourselves here today to a renewed devotion to
the American spirit of determination, so that we can continue to go
forward into a new and exciting era.

- END -
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